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EXTENDED VACANCIES, CRUSHING CASELOADS, 
AND EMERGENCY PANELS IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS OF APPEALS 
Andrew L. Adler* 
I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of 2013, the chief judge of the Eleventh Circuit 
declared a state of emergency, exempting the court from the 
requirement in 28 U.S.C. §46(b) that each of its panels include a 
majority of Eleventh Circuit judges.1 As would later become 
clear, the emergency arose from multiple vacancies on the court, 
which exacerbated the effect of its heavy per-judge caseload. 
Throughout 2014, emergency panels consisting of one Eleventh 
*Associate, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The author 
previously served as a law clerk to Judges Rosemary Barkett and Peter T. Fay of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, as a staff attorney to that court, and as a 
law clerk to Judge Kathleen M. Williams of the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida. The author wishes to thank Pascual Oliu for helpful comments 
on an earlier draft of this article. The views expressed herein belong solely to the author.  
 1. United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Cir., Gen. Order No. 41 (Dec. 30, 
2013) (indicating that under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) the chief judge was certifying “that there is 
an emergency requiring that some cases and controversies before this Court be heard by 
three-judge panels consisting of fewer than two judges of this Court”) [hereinafter General 
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Circuit judge and two visiting judges resolved over one hundred 
appeals.
In a petition for rehearing filed in one such case, an 
unsuccessful appellant challenged the validity of the emergency 
panel.2 Rather than resolving the petition summarily, the 
emergency panel instead published a precedential opinion 
upholding the certified emergency.3 Although other circuits have 
certified section 46(b) emergencies based on the vacancy-
caseload combination, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is the first 
federal appellate decision addressing a challenge to such an 
emergency. Because extended vacancies and heavy caseloads 
are likely to persist, that opinion invites new scrutiny of the 
emergency exception to section 46(b)’s majority requirement. 
This article begins that undertaking.
Part II provides the broader context for discussion and 
analysis of this important issue. It summarizes the heavy, 
vacancy-exacerbated caseloads facing the federal courts of 
appeals, and their use of visiting judges as one tool to help 
manage those caseloads. It details the limitations that Congress 
has placed on the use of visiting judges, focusing on section 
46(b)’s requirement that a majority of the panel be drawn from 
the presiding court, as well as the statutory exceptions to that 
requirement. And it briefly recounts prior instances in which 
circuits have invoked the statute’s emergency exception based 
on extended vacancies and heavy caseloads.  
Part III summarizes the dismal conditions in the Eleventh 
Circuit—four vacancies out of twelve authorized judgeships and 
the highest per-judge caseload of all the circuits—that 
understandably led it to declare an emergency in General Order 
41. It then summarizes General Order 41, the emergency panels 
operating under it, Rodriguez’s challenge to the validity of one 
such panel, and the Rodriguez opinion. 
Part IV analyzes the central statutory issue—namely, 
whether multiple vacancies and a heavy caseload may constitute 
 2. Appellant’s Pet. for Reh’g, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 12-14629, at 8–14 
(11th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Rodriguez Petition]. The Eleventh Circuit’s initial 
panel decision appears at United States v. Rodriguez, 557 F. App’x 930 (11th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 390 (2014). 
3. United States v. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 2014) (denying 
rehearing and holding that “General Order No. 41 declares an emergency clearly 
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an emergency within the meaning of section 46(b)’s exception—
and concludes that the statutory issue is more complicated than 
suggested by the sparse analytical treatment it has received thus 
far.
Part V concludes the article by defending the courts’ broad 
interpretation of section 46(b)’s emergency exception. It 
nonetheless summarizes the concerns about the use of visiting 
judges and recasts the balance that Congress must ultimately 
maintain between difficult competing considerations. It predicts 
that, in this era of extended vacancies and heavy caseloads, the 
federal courts of appeals, now armed with a tested precedent in 
Rodriguez, are likely to continue certifying section 46(b) 
emergencies. It therefore recommends that this practice receive 
additional scrutiny in the context of the vacancy and caseload 
crises facing the federal courts of appeals. 
II. THE BROADER CONTEXT
The federal courts of appeals have long faced a “crisis in 
volume.”4 Annual filings per circuit judge have mushroomed 
over the last sixty years—from seventy-three in 1950, to 
seventy-seven in 1964, to 137 in 1978, to 194 in 1984, to 237 in 
1990, to 300 in 1997, to nearly 370 in 2008, and then 
approximately 330 in 2013.5 “Strikingly, per-judge filings have 
more than quadrupled even as the number of regional courts of 
appeals judges has more than doubled—from 75 in 1950 . . . to 
167 in 2010.”6 “This surge has been attributed largely to a flurry 
of congressional activity in the 1960s, which led to new federal 
rights and mechanisms for obtaining them.”7
Extended judicial vacancies exacerbate the crisis of 
volume, and such vacancies have become commonplace in 
4. See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case 
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 321 (2011) (“By the 1970s, the 
phrase ‘crisis in volume’ was coined to describe the workload of the courts of appeals.”). 
 5. Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of 
How Judges Allocate Time across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 401, 402–03, 405 n.19, 407–09 (2013). 
 6. Levy, supra note 4, at 324 n.44 (citation omitted). 
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recent years.8 For example, in the first five years of the Obama 
administration, the average time between vacancy and 
nomination for circuit judges was 310 days, and the average 
time between nomination and confirmation was 253 days.9 In 
the most extreme cases, some circuit vacancies, including the 
D.C. Circuit seat that became vacant upon John G. Roberts’s 
elevation to Chief Justice,10 have lasted for over eight years.11
For every vacant seat, there is a stack of appeals that must be re-
distributed to judges who have already been confirmed;12 and 
the longer the vacancy, the higher the stack. This increase in 
per-judge caseload predictably leads to delays, backlogs, and 
even sub-optimal work product. The administration of appellate 
justice suffers.13
8. See Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2233, 2234–38 (2013) (summarizing the history of extended circuit vacancies). 
 9. Russell Wheeler, Judicial Nominations and Confirmations: Fact and Fiction,
FixGov: Making Government Work (Dec. 30, 2013, 10:33 a.m.), http://www.brookings.edu 
/blogs/fixgov/posts/2013/12/30-staffing-federal-judiciary-2013-no-breakthrough-year (including 
tables 5 and 11, which show the average number of days from vacancy to nomination and 
the average number of days from nomination through hearing to confirmation in the 
Clinton, G.W. Bush, and Obama administrations) (accessed Feb. 2, 2015; copy on file with 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
10. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Archive of Judicial Vacancies,
Vacancy List as of Dec. 1, 2013, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/Judicial
Vacancies/ArchiveOfJudicialVacancies.aspx (accessed Feb. 4, 2015; copy on file with 
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
11. See Andrew L. Adler, Eight Years and Counting: The Longest Current Judicial 
Vacancy and the Political Dynamic that Produced It, 97 JUDICATURE 125 (Nov./Dec. 
2013) (discussing the circumstances surrounding two such vacancies). 
12. See Carl Tobias, Filling the District of Arizona Vacancies, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. SYL. 5, 
6 (2014) (pointing out that “[t]he vacancy crisis places additional pressure on sitting 
judges”). The article is available at http://www.arizonalawreview.org/2014/syllabus/tobias; 
clicking “view PDF” at the bottom of the page on which it appears links to a copy bearing 
page numbers. 
13. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining the “Crisis of 
Volume”, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 114 (2006) (opining that, in response to the so-
called crisis of volume, “we now take for granted what were once characterized as 
‘emergency’ procedures,” that “[w]e have lowered our expectations for appellate 
procedure,” that “[w]e have defined down our appellate values,” and that “[w]e all have 
internalized the postmodern norms of the minimalist procedural paradigm”); William M. 
Richman, An Argument on the Record for More Federal Judgeships, 1 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 37, 38 (1999) (opining that, as a consequence of the caseload crisis, “the overall 
quality of the work of the circuit courts has declined markedly,” the concomitant case-
management techniques have created a system consisting of two “different tracks of justice 
for different cases and different litigants,” and the “reductions in oral argument deprive[d] 
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To ameliorate their heavy caseload, courts of appeals have 
employed controversial case-management techniques that 
include, for instance, granting oral argument in fewer cases, 
publishing fewer precedential opinions, and delegating increased 
responsibility to law clerks and staff attorneys.14 “Despite these 
innovations, the regional courts of appeals continue to operate 
under stress because filings have, for the most part, continued to 
rise.”15 And the stress persists despite the commendable 
contribution of senior judges, who have “little or no financial 
incentive” to “continue working well after they have reached the 
retirement age of most Americans.”16 While some “have called 
for changes to the courts’ constraints—an increase in the 
numbers of judges or a decrease in the number of cases,” neither 
proposal “has gained political traction in the decades since they 
were first proposed.”17
It is therefore unsurprising that federal courts of appeals 
have also taken advantage of one option that Congress has long 
afforded them: visiting judges.18 To manage their heavy 
caseloads,19 many federal courts of appeals regularly use visiting 
14. See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2393–
2402 (2014) (reviewing William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, INJUSTICE ON 
APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS (Oxford Univ. Press 2013)). 
 15. Levy, supra note  4, at 324.
 16. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional? 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 453, 455 (2007) (“Without senior judges, some appellate courts would 
face a disastrous build-up of backlogs, severe problems administering justice in a timely 
fashion, or even a total breakdown in the trial of civil cases. Senior judges are 
indispensable, essential, inestimable, invaluable.”) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and 
citations omitted). 
 17. Levy, supra note 5, at 404; see Baker, supra note 13, at 112–13 (summarizing prior 
structural proposals to the federal appellate courts, and explaining that “more recently there 
seems to be no interest in them whatsoever on the part of the judges or the Congress, the 
officials with the power to implement them. . . . The powers-that-be apparently have opted 
for retaining the present structure, at least for the indefinite future.”).
18. See Jeffrey Budziak, Fungible Justice: The Use of Visiting Judges in the United 
States Courts of Appeals, at 11–15 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State 
University) (tracing the history of visiting judges back to the mid-nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries), available at https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap/10?0::NO:10:P10_ACCESSION 
_NUM:osu1312564916 (accessed Feb. 3, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate 
Practice and Process).  
19. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 2011 Annual Report of the 
Director, Support to Judges, Visiting Judges, http://www.uscourts.gov/annualreport_2011 
/Support_To_Judges.aspx (“The Judiciary uses intercircuit and intracircuit assignments of 
Article III judges to provide short-term assistance to courts with overwhelming 
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judges from other Article III courts, who temporarily sit by 
designation.20 Each year from 1997 to 2013, at least 300—and 
sometimes more than 400—different visiting judges have 
annually participated in approximately 3,700 to 5,400 appeals 
terminated on the merits, representing from approximately four 
to almost seven percent of all such appeals.21 While this practice 
is not without potential inefficiencies,22 visiting judges help 
relieve the pressure created by heavy caseloads. It has been 
reported, for example, that the consequences for one busy 
appellate court would have been “catastrophic were designated 
Examination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 351, 362–63 (1995) (“Virtually all of the 
circuits . . . stated or implied that district judges were being used routinely to deal with 
heavy appellate work caused by numerous appeals or by unfilled vacancies.”). 
20. See, e.g., Budziak, supra note 18, at 21 (table showing use of visiting judges among 
regional circuits from 1997 to 2010). One notable exception is the D.C. Circuit, which 
rarely uses visiting judges. Levy, supra note 4, at 384 n.414; James J. Brudney & Corey 
Distlear, Designated Diffidence: District Court Judges on the Courts of Appeals, 35 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 565, 575 n.15 (2001). 
21. The statistics mentioned in this sentence were derived by the author from official 
federal-courts data for the years 1997 through 2013. See, e.g., Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, Judicial Business 2013, Table V-2, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Services 
Provided by Visiting Judges in Appeals Terminated (2013) (compiling statistics for 2013), 
Table S-2, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Total Case Participations in Cases Terminated on the 
Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs (same); see also Budziak, supra note 
18, at 19 (figure graphing the number of visiting judges against the number of total appeals 
from 1975 to 2010). For statistics on the use of visiting judges in the Ninth Circuit, for 
example, see Morgan Christen, Introduction, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) 
(“Our circuit also receives considerable help from district judges and judges visiting from 
other parts of the country. In the year ending June 30, 2012, these judges participated in 
4.9% of the appeals our circuit resolved on the merits.”); Susan P. Graber, Introduction, 42 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“This past year, visiting judges participated in more 
than 1,100 cases that were decided on the merits.”); Marsha S. Berzon, Introduction, 41 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 287, 287 n.1 (2011) (noting that the Ninth Circuit “had 185 
visiting judges—district judges from the Ninth Circuit and district and circuit judges from 
elsewhere—helping us out by sitting on panels” in 2010). 
22. See, e.g., Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Committee Answers 
Courts’ Calls for Help, THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 2010, at 10, 10 (noting that Chair of Judicial 
Conference Committee on Intercircuit Assignments suggested that, when compared to in-
circuit visiting judges, out-of-circuit visiting judges may not know the law of the circuit, 
may not know the quality of the work of the assigned judge, and may incur greater travel 
costs); Sara C. Benesh, The Contribution of “Extra” Judges, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 301, 302–03 
(2006) (summarizing inefficiencies with regard to visiting district judges—namely, they 
may be unfamiliar with appellate practice and the operation of the federal courts of 
appeals; they often require assistance; their top priority remains their busy docket back 
home, leading to delays in turn-around time; and they are often assigned lighter cases while 
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judges not available to sit,” and one circuit judge has remarked 
that his court “could not have functioned without” visiting 
district judges.23
Nonetheless, visiting judges are not a panacea, and 
Congress has prescribed procedures and standards that must be 
followed before visiting judges may be designated to sit 
temporarily on the federal courts of appeals. These procedures 
and standards vary based on the status of the visiting judge, 
reflecting the fact that Congress has carefully considered the use 
of visiting judges and does not regard federal judges as fully 
fungible.24 First, the Chief Justice may, “in the public interest,” 
designate out-of-circuit circuit judges “upon request by the chief 
judge or circuit justice” for that circuit.25 Second, the Chief 
Judge of the circuit may designate in-circuit district judges 
“whenever the business of that court so requires.”26 And, third, 
the Chief Justice may designate out-of-circuit district judges 
“upon presentation of a certification of necessity by the chief 
judge or circuit justice of the circuit wherein the need arises.”27
While, in practice, these procedures and standards do not pose 
substantial obstacles, they reflect Congress’s unwillingness to 
allow the unfettered use of visiting judges. 
That unwillingness is most evident in a critical limitation in 
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982.28 The 
accompanying Senate Report observed that, under then-current 
law, “a three-judge appellate panel may be composed of any 
combination of active, senior, designated, or district court 
federal judges.”29 As a result, it was not “infrequent that there 
[would] be only one circuit judge on a panel or that the presiding 
judge [would] be a senior judge or a judge from another 
 23. Benesh, supra note 22, at 304 (quotation marks and citations omitted).  
24. Cf. Glidden v. Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 604 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“My view is that we subtly undermine the constitutional system when we treat federal 
judges as fungible.”).
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 291(a).  
26. Id. § 292(a).
27. Id. § 292(d). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 103(b)(2), 96 Stat. 25, 25–26 (1982) (providing that “at least 
a majority” of the judges sitting on a panel in a federal court of appeals “shall be judges of 
that court, unless such judges cannot sit because recused or disqualified, or unless the chief 
judge of that court certifies that there is an emergency”). 
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circuit.”30 Congress believed that “such situations [would] lead 
to doctrinal instability and unpredictability in the law of the 
circuit because district court and court of appeals judges from 
outside the circuit may not know or may not feel bound by the 
law of that circuit.”31 Congress therefore drew the line at one 
visiting judge per panel, revising section 46(b) to require that 
panels consist of “three judges, at least a majority of whom shall 
be judges of that court.”32 Congress believed that, as visiting 
judges became more frequently utilized,33 this majority 
requirement would “discourage[ ] any unnecessary borrowing of 
judges”34 and “provide greater stability and predictability in the 
law being applied in any given area of the country.”35 In short, 
section 46(b), as amended, reflects a strong Congressional 
preference that appellate panels be composed of at least two 
judges of the presiding court. 
Significantly, however, Congress also codified exceptions 
in two “unless” clauses. Specifically, section 46(b) provides that 
appeals may be resolved by 
panels, each consisting of three judges, at least a majority 
of whom shall be judges of that court, unless such judges 
cannot sit because recused or disqualified, or unless the
chief judge of that court certifies that there is an emergency 
including, but not limited to, the unavailability of a judge of 
the court because of illness.36
Thus, Congress included one exception for recusals or 
disqualifications, and one for emergencies. For present purposes, 
the key statutory issue is whether the emergency exception—“an 
emergency including, but not limited to, the unavailability of a 
judge of the court because of illness”—encompasses situations 
30. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 19. 
31. Id.
 32. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b).  
 33. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 29, at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 19 
(acknowledging that “a substantial number of judges from outside the circuit sit[ ] by 
designation” and that “district judges sit[ ] regularly on the courts of appeals”). 
34. Id.
35. Id. at 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N at 36; see In re Bongiorno, 694 F.2d 917, 
918 n.1 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Congress’s purpose in enacting [§ 46(b)] was to prevent the 
instability and unpredictability in the law of a circuit that could result if many panels were 
composed principally of judges from ‘outside’ the circuit.”) (citations omitted).  
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in which extended vacancies exacerbate the burden that a court’s 
heavy caseload poses for the other judges. 
At least a handful of courts of appeals have resolved that 
issue affirmatively, certifying an emergency under section 46(b) 
based on the vacancy-caseload combination. For example, the 
Fifth Circuit has done so at least twice, once in 1991 and again 
in 1999. In each case, the chief judge’s certification order 
described the court’s heavy caseload, the number of vacancies, 
and the uncertain status of filling those vacancies.37 Notably, in 
the 1991 order, Chief Judge Charles Clark criticized the 
executive for failing to make nominations to fill the vacancies, 
despite the court’s pleas for help.38
Other courts have also certified section 46(b) emergencies 
based on vacancies and caseload. For example, the Second 
Circuit certified a section 46(b) emergency in 1998 “when five 
out of thirteen judicial positions on the circuit had become 
vacant—and were left unfilled by a Senate hostile to the 
President’s nominees.”39 That court ultimately resolved over 
fifty appeals with emergency panels.40 The Tenth Circuit 
reportedly certified a section 46(b) emergency based on 
vacancies and caseload in 1994.41 And, as mentioned at the 
37. See Order Declaring an Emergency Under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (5th Cir. Sept. 28, 
1999) (Carolyn Dineen King, C.J.) (“In sum, the three judicial vacancies, the injury to an 
active judge and the sustained high level of case filings have created a judicial emergency 
in the court.”); Order Declaring an Emergency under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (5th Cir. Oct. 28, 
1991) (Charles Clark, C.J.) (“This court is authorized to have 17 judges in regular active 
service. Today, the number of judges so serving is 13. Only one nomination has been sent 
to the Senate for its advice and consent. It is now pending in the Senate. The circuit is 
experiencing increases in appellate filings greater than those experienced in any other 
United States court of appeals.”) [hereinafter Clark Emergency Order]. 
 38. Clark Emergency Order, supra note 37; see also A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques 
of Case Management: The Challenge of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 883 n.36 (1993) (quoting Clark Emergency Order and, echoing 
Congress’s concern underlying the majority requirement, noting that panels composed of 
multiple visiting judges would have a “significant impact on the precedential value of the 
decisions rendered as well as on litigant satisfaction”).
 39. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (2011). 
 40. These cases are identifiable by an asterisk footnote. See, e.g., United States v. 
Truscello, 168 F.3d 61, 62 n.*** (2d Cir. 1999) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) and an 
order of the Chief Judge of this Court certifying a judicial emergency, this case was heard 
by an emergency panel consisting of one judge from this Court and two judges from the 
United States District Court sitting by designation.”). 
 41. Gordon Bermant, Jeffrey A. Hennemuth & A. Fletcher Mangum, Judicial
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beginning of this article, the Eleventh Circuit recently did so in 
General Order 41.42
Thus, several circuits have, understandably, taken the 
position that judicial vacancies and a heavy caseload can give 
rise to an emergency for purposes of section 46(b). That position 
is reinforced by the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, which compiles a list of vacancies that it considers 
“judicial emergencies” in urgent need of filling.43 For the federal 
courts of appeals, it determines judicial emergencies based on 
the duration of vacancies and the number of filings per panel in 
a circuit, with the weight of filings adjusted based on the type of 
case.44 While these judicial emergencies have no legal 
relationship to section 46(b), they indicate that the federal 
judiciary, as an institution,45 believes that extended vacancies 
319, 319 n.2 (1994) (noting that the Tenth Circuit declared an emergency under § 46(b) 
“because of persistent vacancies and increasing workload,” citing Chief Judge’s Order 
Declaring an Emergency under 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (10th Cir. Mar. 29, 1994)).  
 42. Other examples may exist, but unfortunately they are difficult to identify. With the 
exception of General Order 41, emergency certification orders are generally not available 
on courts’ websites or legal databases, and opinions issued in cases decided by irregular 
panels often do not explain the reason for their composition. For example, the Eighth 
Circuit certified a section 46(b) emergency in 2000, resolving at least seventeen appeals 
with emergency panels, but the opinions did not specify the nature of the emergency. See, 
e.g., United States v. Gallardo-Marquez, 253 F.3d 1121, 1122 n.3 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(b), the Chief Judge certified the existence of a judicial 
emergency necessitating the designation of a panel consisting of fewer than two members 
of the Court of Appeals.”). The Fourth Circuit resolved at least fifteen cases with panels 
consisting of two visiting judges from 1990 to 1994, but the opinions did not reference 
section 46(b). See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 19, at 382 & n.134 (citing cases). And 
the same is true of at least one Eleventh Circuit case decided before General Order 41. See
Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 226 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 2000) (Carnes, J., concerning the 
denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Parris v. The Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 216 F.3d 
1298, 1299 (11th Cir. 2000)).  
 43. United States Courts, Judges & Judgeships, Judicial Vacancies, Judicial Emergencies,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies/JudicialEmergencies.aspx
(characterizing thirteen vacancies, one of which had existed for 3,322 days as of early 
February 2015, as judicial emergencies) (accessed Feb. 4, 2015; copy on file with Journal 
of Appellate Practice and Process). 
44. See id. (defining “judicial emergency” for federal courts of appeals as “any vacancy 
in a court of appeals where adjusted filings per panel are in excess of 700; or any vacancy 
in existence more than 18 months where adjusted filings are between 500 to 700 per 
panel”); see also Arthur D. Hellman, Assessing Judgeship Needs in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals: Policy Choices and Process Concerns, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 239, 244–52 
(2003) (discussing the adjusted-filing metric in the context of requests for additional 
judgeships).
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and a heavy caseload can give rise to an “emergency.”  
More surprising is that section 46(b) emergency 
certifications went unchallenged in court.46 Indeed, emergency 
panels have resolved numerous appeals over the years, which 
likely produced dissatisfied litigants, and there have been 
challenges to the composition of other irregular panels in the 
past.47 While some of those challenges involved section 46(b) 
and related issues, none challenged the certification of a section 
46(b) emergency, let alone one based on the vacancy-caseload 
combination. The Eleventh Circuit recently confronted and 
addressed the first such challenge. 
III. THE DISMAL CONDITIONS IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT,
GENERAL ORDER NO. 41, AND THE RODRIGUEZ CASE
A. Conditions in the Eleventh Circuit 
At the time the Eleventh Circuit split off from the Fifth 
Circuit in 1981, it “was a court of twelve judges and 2,556 
“supervision and direction of the Judicial Conference of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 
604(a), which is charged with, inter alia, “mak[ing] a comprehensive survey of the 
condition of business in the courts of the United States and prepar[ing] plans for 
assignment of judges to or from circuits or districts where necessary.” 28 U.S.C. § 331. 
 46. Or, at least, any such challenges went unaddressed by the courts and thus went 
unreported.
47. See, e.g., Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003) (holding that a Ninth Circuit 
panel consisting of two Article III judges and one Article IV judge lacked authority to 
decide petitioners’ appeals); United States v. Desimone, 140 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that the majority requirement of § 46(b) was not violated when a circuit judge 
on a panel died after oral argument, and the decision was rendered by one circuit judge and 
one visiting judge); Murray v. Nat’l Broadcasting Co., Inc., 35 F.3d 45, 46 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(concluding that a “case may be validly adjudicated by a panel of two circuit judges under 
circumstances where one of the three judges originally assigned to hear the appeal recused 
himself immediately before oral argument”); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough Cnty., 995 F.2d 
185, 185–86 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (holding that a senior judge was a “judge of that 
court” for purposes of § 46(b)’s majority requirement); United States v. Claiborne, 870 
F.2d 1463, 1466–67 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting argument that chief judge of the Ninth 
Circuit should have polled the other circuit judges of the Ninth Circuit before certifying the 
need for out-of-circuit circuit judges under 28 U.S.C. § 291(a)); Bongiorno, 694 F.2d at 
918 n.1 (concluding, sua sponte, that senior judges constituted “judges of that court” for 
purposes of § 46(b)’s majority requirement); Bessemer & Lake Erie R. Co. v. I.C.C., 691 
F.2d 1104, 1117 (3d Cir. 1982) (upholding the validity of a panel composed of one active 
circuit judge and two district judges, because all of the other circuit judges had disqualified 





      05/20/2015   10:47:31
36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 17 Side B      05/20/2015   10:47:31
ADLERRESEND2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2015 12:02 PM
174 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
filings.”48 From 2012 to 2014, over thirty years later, filings 
ranged from approximately 6,000 to almost 6,500, ranking it 
third among the circuits in total appeals filed.49 Despite this 
substantial increase in volume, the Eleventh Circuit still has only 
twelve authorized judgeships. That is by request. In 2003, the 
Judicial Conference of the United States submitted 
recommendations to Congress for additional circuit judgeships; 
based on the adjusted-filing caseload metric used, the Eleventh 
Circuit would have been justified in requesting at least ten new 
judgeships.50 Seeking to remain as small as possible, however, 
the court declined to request a single new judgeship, citing 
concerns about the coherence and stability of circuit precedent, 
as well as collegiality.51
The result is that the Eleventh Circuit is one of the busiest 
federal appellate courts in the country. In 2013, the Eleventh 
Circuit had the most total appeals filed and total appeals 
terminated when those numbers were divided by the number of 
authorized panels.52 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit issued 325 
written opinions per active judge; the next closest circuit issued 
only 234, and only one other circuit issued over 200.53 The 
Eleventh Circuit terminated 913 actions on the merits per active 
judge; the next closest circuit terminated 745, and only one other 
circuit terminated more than 700.54 And the Eleventh Circuit 
 48. Hellman, supra note 44, at 254.
49. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Statistics, Federal Judicial 
Caseload Statistics, Caseload Statistics 2014, Table B-1 (showing 6,047 new cases 
commenced in the Eleventh Circuit); Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 
Statistics, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Caseload Statistics 2013, Table B-1
(showing 6,226 new cases commenced in the Eleventh Circuit);  Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts, Statistics, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Caseload
Statistics 2012, Table B-1 (showing 6,446 new cases commenced in the Eleventh Circuit). 
 50. Hellman, supra note 44, at 253 & n.49, 255 n.54.
51. Id. at 255; see id. at 254–60 (questioning the Eleventh Circuit’s decision not to 
request additional judgeships despite a significant rise in caseload).
 52. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management 
Statistics Archive, Appeals Summary Pages, U.S. Court of Appeals Summary—12-Month 
Period Ending December 31, 2013 [hereinafter December 2013 Summary]. An electronic 
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issued 243 procedural terminations per active judge; the next 
closest circuit had 139, and no other circuit had more than 100.55
Similar numbers existed in 2012 and 2011. In 2012, the 
Eleventh Circuit was comfortably first in total appeals filed and 
total appeals terminated per panel.56 Likewise, the court led the 
way with 291 written opinions per active judge and 214 
procedural terminations per active judge (more than double the 
next circuit); and it was second in terminations on the merits per 
active judge.57 In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit again led in total 
appeals filed and total appeals terminated per panel.58 And the 
court was first in procedural terminations per active judge, and 
only slightly trailed the Fourth Circuit in both written opinions 
per active judge and terminations on the merits per active 
judge.59
 Given the historical increase in filings but static number 
of judgeships, the Eleventh Circuit can ill afford extended 
judicial vacancies. Yet in 2013, the Eleventh Circuit ranked 
second among the circuits with 29.2 months as the total number 
of months with vacant judgeships.60 In 2012, it ranked fourth 
with nineteen months.61 And, in 2011, it again endured 19.1 total 
months.62 Because the Eleventh Circuit has one of the highest 
55. Id.
 56. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management 
Statistics Archive, Appeals Summary Pages, U.S. Court of Appeals Summary—12-Month 
Period Ending December 31, 2012 [hereinafter December 2012 Summary]. An electronic 




 58. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management 
Statistics Archive, Appeals Summary Pages, U.S. Court of Appeals Summary—12-Month 
Period Ending December 31, 2011 [hereinafter December 2011 Summary]. An electronic 
copy of the Summary is available at http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/ 
Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2011/Appeals _ FCMS _ Summary _ Pages _
December_2011.pdf. 
59. Id.
 60. See December 2013 Summary, supra note 52, at Explanation of Selected Terms
(providing that “[v]acant judgeship months are the total number of months that vacancies 
occurred in any judgeship position in a circuit or district”).
 61. December 2012 Summary, supra note 56.
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per-judge caseloads even when all of its judgeships are filled,63
these vacancies greatly exacerbated the difficulties caused by 
that heavy caseload.
Four of these vacancies existed as of December 30, 2013, 
when the court declared its emergency.64 The first vacancy arose 
with the retirement of Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr., in August 
2010.65 The second vacancy arose in July 2012, when Judge J.L. 
Edmondson took senior status after serving for over twenty-five 
years on the court.66 The third vacancy arose on September 30, 
2013, when Judge Rosemary Barkett retired after serving for 
nearly twenty years on the court.67 The final vacancy arose on 
October 26, 2013, when Judge Joel F. Dubina took senior status 
after serving for over twenty years on the court.68 Notably, even 
before Judge Barkett announced her retirement,69 Judge Dubina 
had selflessly decided to delay taking senior status for several 
 63. For example, the court had no vacancies in 2008, yet still had the most appeals filed 
and terminated per panel, the most terminations on the merits per judge, and the most 
procedural terminations per judge. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 
Federal Court Management Statistics Archive, Appeals Summary Pages, U.S. Court of 
Appeals—Judicial Caseload Profile (comparing the circuits). An electronic copy of the 
Profile is available at http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsa2008.pl.
And, in 2002, the court had only one vacancy, yet still had the highest adjusted filings per 
panel of any circuit. See Hellman, supra note 44, at 253 (recounting that adjusted filings 
per panel were 1,120 in the Eleventh Circuit, whereas that figure ranged from 583 to 870 
for four circuits requesting additional judgeships). 
 64. There was another vacancy on the court from February 2011, when Judge Susan H. 
Black took senior status, to February 2012, when Judge Adalberto J. Jordan was confirmed 
to fill the vacancy. Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (type “Jordan” in search box, click 
“Go,” then click “Jordan, Adalberto Jose”) (indicating that Judge Jordan was nominated on 
August 2, 2012, and commissioned on February 17, 2012); id. (type “Black” in search box, 
click “Go,” then click “Black, Susan Harrell”) (indicating that Judge Black took senior 
status on February 25, 2011) (both accessed Feb. 6, 2015; copies on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process). 
 65. Id. (type “Birch” in search box, click “Go,” then click “Birch, Stanley F. Jr.”) 
(accessed Feb. 6, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 66. Id. (type “Edmondson” in search box, click “Go,” then click “Edmondson, James 
Larry”) (accessed Feb. 6, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process).
 67. Id. (type “Barkett” in search box, click “Go,” then click “Barkett, Rosemary”) 
(accessed Feb. 6, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 68. Id. (type “Dubina” in search box, click “Go,” then click “Dubina, Joel Fredrick”) 
(accessed Feb. 6, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 69. Bill Rankin, Barkett to Leave Appeals Court, Atlanta J.-Constitution, Aug. 19, 
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months due to the court’s pending vacancies and heavy 
caseload,70 explaining that “[l]eaving the Court with three 
vacancies is just an intolerable situation for my colleagues.”71
In sum: Filings have more than doubled in the Eleventh 
Circuit since its creation; the number of authorized judgeships 
has nonetheless remained the same; four of the court’s twelve 
authorized judgeships were vacant at the time of the certified 
emergency; one seat had been vacant for over three years, and 
another seat had been vacant for well over a year; the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts considered all 
four vacancies judicial emergencies;72 and the Eleventh Circuit 
led the circuits in per-judge caseload in 2013. If extended 
vacancies and a heavy per-judge caseload can constitute an 
emergency within the meaning of section 46(b), then it would be 
difficult to dispute that the conditions in the Eleventh Circuit 
rose to that level in late 2013.
B. General Order 41 
On December 30, 2013, about two months after the fourth 
vacancy arose, the Eleventh Circuit issued General Order 41.73
Writing “for the Court,”74 Chief Judge Carnes, after quoting the 
relevant portions of section 46(b), “certif[ied] that there is an 
emergency requiring some cases and controversies before this 
Court to be heard and determined by three-judge panels 
consisting of fewer than two judges of this Court.”75 The Order 
was to “remain in effect until [Chief Judge Carnes] or another 
judge duly authorized to act as Chief Judge formally declare[d] 
 70. Bill Rankin, Chief Judge May Wait before Taking Senior Status, AJC.com (Feb. 4, 
2013, 6:31 p.m.), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/chief-judge-may-wait-before-taking
-senior-status/nWFtj/ (accessed Feb. 6, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate 
Practice and Process). 
71. Id.
 72. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Archive of Judicial Vacancies,
Judicial Emergencies as of Dec. 1, 2013, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/ 
JudicialVacancies/ArchiveOfJudicialVacancies.aspx (accessed Feb. 9, 2015; copy on file 
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 73. General Order 41, supra note 1. 
74. Id. at 2. 
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that a 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) emergency no longer exists.”76
Although General Order 41 did not specify the nature of the 
emergency, Chief Judge Carnes gave an interview shortly after it 
was issued, confirming that the emergency arose from the 
court’s four vacancies and heavy caseload.77
Shortly after General Order 41 was issued, emergency 
panels began presiding over oral arguments in non-capital cases 
scheduled for oral argument. While such cases account for only 
approximately ten percent of the court’s cases,78 they are often 
the most difficult; hence their placement on the oral argument 
calendar. As of February 26, 2015, emergency panels had 
resolved 113 Eleventh Circuit appeals. The composition of the 
emergency panels varied, and included the following 
combinations: one active Eleventh Circuit judge and two in-
circuit district judges;79 one active Eleventh Circuit judge and 
two out-of-circuit district judges;80 one senior Eleventh Circuit 
judge and two in-circuit district judges;81 one active Eleventh 
Circuit judge, one in-circuit district judge, and one out-of-circuit 
district judge;82 one active Eleventh Circuit judge, one out-of-
76. Id. at 1–2. 
 77. Alyson M. Palmer, Expect to See More Visiting Judges at 11th Circuit: Vacancies 
Lead Chief Judge to Temporarily Allow More Than One Visiting Judge Per Panel, DAILY 
REP., Jan. 13, 2014, at 1. Chief Judge Carnes opined in the interview that section 46(b)’s 
majority requirement was “a rule for a good reason,” but explained that he could not “ask 
our active judges [to do] any more. We’re all just so darn busy.” Id. Addressing the 
implications of General Order 41 in an interview with the same reporter, Judge Birch 
commented that “in his experience visiting judges do not defer on legal matters to the 
Eleventh Circuit judges with which they sit,” but that “it’s possible [that] having panels 
with two visiting judges will cause the court to take up a few more cases as a whole court 
sitting en banc,” since the Eleventh Circuit judges may be “more attuned to looking at 
panel opinions where there’s only one circuit judge on there.” Id. Addressing a related 
matter in the same interview, Chief Judge Carnes recounted how the court had “resisted 
increasing the size of the court” to avoid “dilut[ing] the court’s collegiality or prestige or 
mak[ing] it more difficult to preserve the stability and cohesiveness of the court’s 
precedent.” Id. The latter concerns would presumably also arise by using more visiting 
judges. 
 78. In the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2013, 11.3 percent of the appeals 
terminated on the merits in the Eleventh Circuit received oral argument. Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts, Table S-1, U.S. Court of Appeals—Appeals Terminated 
on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on the Briefs (2013). 
79. E.g., United States v. Charlton, 559 F. App’x 845 (11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2014). 
80. E.g., Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Moore, 763 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2014). 
81. E.g., Metcalfe v. Postmaster Gen., 556 F. App’x 909 (11th Cir. Mar. 3, 2014). 
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circuit circuit judge, and one in-circuit district judge;83 one 
active Eleventh Circuit judge, one judge of the United States 
Court of International Trade, and one in-circuit district judge;84
and one active Eleventh Circuit judge, one judge of the United 
States Court of International Trade, and one out-of-circuit 
district judge.85
Of the 113 opinions issued under General Order 41 thus 
far,86 fifty have been precedential and sixty-three have been non-
precedential.87 Visiting trial judges (both district judges and 
judges from the Court of International Trade) have played a 
crucial role on these emergency panels. Panels that included two 
visiting trial judges have heard forty-two of the fifty 
precedential opinions and fifty-one of the sixty-three non-
precedential opinions.88 At least one trial judge has participated 
in the remaining cases.89 Moreover, of the fifty precedential 
opinions issued under General Order 41, twenty-four have been 
authored by visiting judges, twenty of those by trial judges.90
Not only have visiting trial judges authored precedential91 (and 
non-precedential92) majority opinions, but they have done so 
over dissents,93 and they themselves have written separately.94
Visiting circuit judges have likewise authored precedential and 
83. E.g., United States v. Peluffo, 558 F. App’x 853 (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2014). 
84. E.g., Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090 (11th Cir. 2014). 
85. E.g., Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 86. It is possible that some other decisions will be issued by General Order 41 panels, 
as there may at the time of this writing still be cases in which oral arguments have been 
held before Order 41 panels, but opinions have not yet been issued. See infra n.162 and 
accompanying text.  
 87. Andrew L. Adler, Emergency Panels in the Eleventh Circuit after December 30, 
2013 (Sept. 12,  2014; updated Feb. 26, 2015) (unpublished compendium on file with 
author) (containing information on cases compiled by searching “sitting by designation” 




91. E.g., In re Scantling, 754 F.3d 1323, 1325 n.** (11th Cir. 2014) (characterizing 
Judge Schlesinger as sitting by designation). 
92. E.g., United States v. Vinales, 565 F. App’x 518 (11th Cir. 2014). 
93. E.g., West v. Davis, 767 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir. Sept. 8, 2014) (Bartle, J.); id. at 
1073 (Benavides, J., dissenting in part). 
94. E.g., Wetherington v. AmeriPath, Inc., 566 F. App’x 850, 852 *2 (11th Cir. 2014) 
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dissenting opinions of their own.95 In short, visiting judges, 
particularly trial judges, had a noticeable impact on the Circuit’s 
precedent in 2014.  
C. Rodriguez on Rehearing 
Rodriguez was decided by an emergency panel composed 
of a senior Eleventh Circuit judge and two visiting in-circuit 
district judges, and it rejected Rodriguez’s appeal in a short 
unpublished opinion.96 Rodriguez filed a petition for rehearing, 
challenging, inter alia, General Order 41 and the validity of the 
emergency panel’s composition.97
Observing that the issue appeared to be one of first 
impression,98 Rodriguez made the following arguments: 
General Order 41 impermissibly failed to identify 
the nature of the emergency, thereby precluding 
effective review.99
Section 46(b)’s emergency exception might modify 
the requirement that there be three judges on a panel 
rather than the requirement that a majority of the 
judges on a panel be “judges of that court.”100
Section 46(b)’s emergency exception applies only 
to “uncontrollable event[s] affecting a discrete set 
of circumstances,” a specific judge, or a particular 
category of cases, because the statutory example of 
illness refers to an “unexpected, temporary, and 
95. E.g., West, 767 F.3d at 1073 (Benavides, J., dissenting in part); Osorio v. State 
Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1246 n.* (11th Cir. 2014) (indicating that Judge 
Gilman, who wrote for the court in Osorio, is a senior Sixth Circuit judge). 
96. Rodriguez, 557 F. App’x 930. 
 97. Rodriguez Petition, supra note 2.  
98. Id. at 10–11 (asserting that “[t]he statute is capable of more than one reading, and it 
is possible that the emergency provision of [the] statute is meant to apply only to the three-
judge requirement,” and taking the position that, “[b]ecause this is an issue of first 
impression in this Court, it should be addressed by the Court”), 14 (asserting that “it is at 
least subject to serious question whether an emergency within the meaning of § 46(b) 
exists,” and characterizing that question as an additional “first impression issue”). 
99. Id. at 12–13. 
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dramatic event . . . meeting the ordinary 
understanding of the term ‘emergency.’”101
Rather than summarily denying Rodriguez’s petition, the 
emergency panel addressed the issue in a four-page precedential 
opinion.102
1. An Unaddressed Threshold Issue 
As an initial matter, it is procedurally interesting that 
Rodriguez filed his petition for rehearing with the panel he 
claimed to have been invalid, and the panel accepted the 
invitation to adjudicate its own validity. Although the Rodriguez
situation has apparently never been considered by another court, 
a decision by an emergency panel upholding its own validity 
may not seem to possess the hallmarks of neutrality. 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Desimone, for example, is 
instructive on this point. There, the court denied a petition for 
rehearing that challenged the validity of a two-judge panel 
composed of one Second Circuit judge and one visiting judge 
when the third judge, a Second Circuit judge, died after oral 
argument.103 However, the Chief Judge designated himself to the 
panel to resolve the rehearing petition (and authored the 
resulting opinion) after one of the two quorum judges opined 
that it “would not be appropriate for a two-judge panel with only 
one member of this court to resolve this particular claim.”104
Moreover, the Rodriguez panel, consisting of a senior 
Eleventh Circuit judge and two visiting judges, could have even 
questioned whether it had the authority to invalidate—or even to 
consider invalidating—General Order 41, an order entered “for 
the Court” by the Chief Judge. Conversely, had the panel found 
101. Id. at 11–13. Giving effect to an indefinite suspension would be particularly 
inappropriate, Rodriguez argued, when the asserted emergency “relates to a perception that 
Congress has intentionally or otherwise acted so as not to replace retiring judges,” because 
this would “intrude on the Congressional authority to determine the membership needs of a 
particular court.” Id. at 11. 
102. United States v. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 103. 140 F.3d at 458–59 (pointing out that “[s]ection 46(d) embodies no requirement 
that the quorum contain a majority of judges who are members of the court; it requires only 
that it be a majority of a legally authorized panel”). 
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itself to have been invalidly constituted, such a finding would 
have raised the circuitous issue of whether that decision would 
itself have been valid. That quandary would have been far from 
academic, because such a decision would have threatened the 
legitimacy of all emergency panels authorized by General Order 
41, and would thus have had a significant administrative impact. 
These concerns might have been mitigated had the full 
court resolved Rodriguez’s challenge. To be fair, his petition 
was addressed only to the original panel, and en banc review 
would have required substantial judicial resources that were 
particularly scarce at the time.105 But General Order 41 was 
issued by the chief judge on behalf of the court, and thus the full 
court was best suited to adjudicate its validity. And a decision 
declaring it invalid would have had circuit-wide implications, 
both with regard to appeals already adjudicated by emergency 
panels and with regard to the prospective use of such panels. In 
this respect, the situation can be analogized to other issues of 
circuit-wide administration that the Eleventh Circuit has 
considered en banc in the past, including whether its own senior 
circuit judges are “judges of that court” for purposes of section 
46(b)’s majority requirement,106 whether a recess appointment 
confers full authority to act as a federal judge,107 and whether 
 105. Although it would have been unusual for the full court to have reheard the case on 
its own motion, it might have done so if its members had been made aware of the grounds 
for Rodriguez’s motion. See 11th Cir. R. 35, I.O.P. 6 (“Any active Eleventh Circuit judge 
may request that the court be polled on whether rehearing en banc should be granted 
whether or not a petition for rehearing en banc has been filed by a party.”). Despite various 
revisions to the Eleventh Circuit’s rules over the past few years, this version of the Rule 35 
IOP was in effect during the spring and summer of 2014, when Rodriguez’s motion for 
rehearing was filed and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision on rehearing came down. See, e.g.,
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Rules & Procedures, Previous 
Revisions to 11th Circuit Rules and IOP (12 Months), http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/rules/ 
previous-revisions (accessed Feb. 10, 2015; copies of relevant pages on file with Journal of 
Appellate Practice and Process). 
106. Cone Corp., 995 F.2d at 185–86 (holding that senior judges are among the “judges 
of that court” referred to in §46(b)). Two years earlier, the court, in General Order Number 
11, had suspended one of its local rules requiring that two active Eleventh Circuit judges sit 
on every panel; instead, the Order required that two Eleventh Circuit judges sit on every 
panel, but that only one of those judges had to be an active judge.  United States Court of 
Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, General Order No. 11 (Apr. 30, 1991). A copy of General Order 
11 is available at http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/General 
Order11.pdf. 
 107. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (upholding Judge 
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the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit should be adopted as 
binding precedent.108 As in those cases, an en banc resolution in 
Rodriguez would have resoundingly settled the issue.
2. The Opinion 
The Rodriguez panel deserves praise for explicitly 
recognizing the importance of the issue raised by the petition 
and for publishing its opinion.109 Indeed, in denying the petition, 
the panel began by observing that, although its underlying 
decision was unpublished, the validity of the panel’s 
composition was an issue of such significance that the opinion 
on rehearing “warrant[ed] publication.”110 Furthermore, the 
court noted that Rodriguez had waived the issue by failing to 
raise it earlier, as the composition of the panel was revealed two 
weeks before oral argument.111 “However,” the court continued, 
“the significance of the issue for the effective operation of the 
judicial functions of this court prompts us to nevertheless 
address the issue in an alternative holding.”112 The easiest course 
of action would have been to issue the customary summary 
denial, particularly given the court’s finding that Rodriguez had 
analogous dilemma in that members of the court disagreed about whether it was 
appropriate for them to adjudicate the constitutionality of their own colleague’s 
appointment. The majority found no impediment and noted that no recusal request had 
been lodged. See id. at 1228 n.14. One dissenting judge, however, believed it was “nearly 
anathema for circuit court judges to review a colleague’s legitimacy to sit as a member of 
their court,” and that doing so would call into question the court’s impartiality and thus 
“imperil[ ] public confidence in the Court.” Id. at 1239–40 (Wilson, J., dissenting).  
 108. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 
Readers interested in a more detailed consideration of this issue may consult Andrew L. 
Adler, Benefitting from Bonner: The Enduring Significance of Former Fifth Circuit 
Decisions in Eleventh Circuit Jurisprudence, RECORD: J. OF FLA. BAR APP. PRAC.
SECTION 1 (Summer 2012). 
 109. Cf. Murray, 35 F.3d 45. Denying a petition for rehearing in Murray, a panel of two 
Second Circuit judges held itself to be a quorum authorized to resolve the underlying 
appeal when the third judge recused himself shortly before the oral argument. Id. at 46–47. 
Although the two-judge quorum found it appropriate to resolve the petition without adding 
a third judge, id. at 48, they acknowledged that the petition “raise[d] an institutional issue 
of court procedure that merit[ed] a brief opinion,” id. at 46, and “[b]ecause this opinion 
concerns, in part, an administrative matter,” announced that “the opinion ha[d] been 
circulated to all of the active judges of this Court prior to filing,” id. at 48 n.1.  
110. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1206. 
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waived the issue. But had the panel opted for that course, the 
emergency underlying General Order 41 would have remained 
officially unexplained, the statutory issues would have gone 
unexplored, and Rodriguez’s ability to seek Supreme Court 
review would have therefore been effectively curtailed.113
The panel’s core statutory analysis was contained in three 
short paragraphs. After referencing General Order 41 and 
quoting section 46(b), the court first confirmed that the certified 
emergency did indeed arise from the court’s vacancies and 
heavy caseload. The court, taking judicial notice, explained that 
“[i]t was a well-known and indisputable fact” that only eight of 
its authorized twelve judgeships were occupied both at the time 
of General Order 41 and at the time of oral argument, that “the 
Circuit has experienced several vacancies for an extended time, 
and that, even with a full complement of the Circuit’s authorized 
judges, the Circuit has a heavy case load per-judge.”114
Rather than detail the vacancies or the heavy per-judge 
caseload, the court instead began a new paragraph by “hold[ing] 
that Chief Judge’s General Order No. 41 declares an emergency 
clearly contemplated by Congress in § 46(b).”115 The court 
emphasized that “[t]he statute contemplate[d] the possibility of 
such an emergency even in the event of an extended illness of a 
single judge.”116 Although the word “extended” is not contained 
in section 46(b), the court opined that “the illness example must 
refer to an extended illness, because a sudden, temporary illness 
of a judge after originally [being] designated to serve on a 
113. Cf. Richard M. Re, Should Lower Courts Facilitate Supreme Court Review? Re’s 
Judicata (Oct. 16, 2014, 3:31PM), http://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/10/16/ 
should-lower-courts-facilitate-supreme-court-review/ (considering whether there is a duty 
to facilitate such review) (accessed Feb. 10, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate 
Practice and Process). Following the denial of rehearing, Rodriguez unsuccessfully sought 
certiorari, in which he largely reiterated the arguments from his rehearing petition. Pet. for 
Writ of Certiorari, Rodriguez v. United States, No. 14-288, 2014 WL 4477706 (Aug. 27, 
2014); see 135 S. Ct. 390 (2014) (denying certiorari). While the denial of certiorari in 
Rodriguez is unsurprising given the absence of a circuit split, the Supreme Court has 
periodically reviewed challenges to the composition of lower courts. See, e.g., Samuel P. 
Jordan, Irregular Panels, 60 ALA. L. REV. 547, 553–56 (2009) (summarizing such 
Supreme Court cases).  
114. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1207. 
115. Id.
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particular panel is otherwise provided for in § 46(d),”117 which 
provides that “[a] majority of the number of judges authorized to 
constitute . . . a panel . . . shall constitute a quorum.”118
Therefore, the court reasoned, “[i]t follows a fortiori that the 
extended shortage of judges caused by the vacancies here, 
together with the heavy per-judge caseload of this Circuit, 
qualifies as an emergency contemplated by Congress.”119
The court then “readily reject[ed]” Rodriguez’s argument 
that the two “unless” clauses of the statute modified the 
requirement that there be three judges instead of the requirement 
that a majority of those judges be judges “of that court.”120
Rather, the court held 
that the two “unless” clauses modify, and provide an 
exception from, the more immediate of the two preceding 
phrases. That is, we hold that the two “unless” clauses 
provide an exception to the requirement that a majority of 
the three judges on the panel be judges of that court.121
For support, the court cited a footnote in a Second Circuit 
decision indicating that the two exceptions “probably modify” 
the majority requirement.122 The court left open the possibility 
that—but declined to address whether—the exceptions also 
modified the requirement that there be three judges on a 
117. Id. at 1207 n.3. 
 118. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). 
119. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1207. 
120. Id. at 1207 n.4. 
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Whitehall Tenants Corp. v. Whitehall Realty Co., 136 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 
1998)). In Whitehall, the Second Circuit denied a petition for rehearing that challenged the 
validity of a decision rendered by a quorum of two in-circuit judges when the third in-
circuit judge on the panel recused after participating in oral argument, and one of the other 
judges listened to a recording of the argument instead of attending in person. 136 F.2d at 
231–33. Although the “unless clauses” in § 46(b) were only “arguably relevant” to the 
matters at issue there, the Whitehall court considered whether they modified the 
requirement that there be three judges on a panel or the requirement that a majority of the 
panel’s judges be members of the court hearing the case. Id. at 232 n.3. While the 
Whitehall court found the issue to be “unclear,” it stated that “[t]he structure and 
juxtaposition of the two ‘unless’ clauses suggest that they are exceptions to the same 
requirement,” and concluded that they “probably modify” the majority requirement. Id.
The Whitehall court hypothesized that, if the “unless” clauses modified the “requirement 
that a panel consist of three judges, the requirement that two of the judges must be 
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panel.123 Observing that there was “very little precedent bearing 
on this issue,”124 the Rodriguez court also cited the Fifth 
Circuit’s 1991 and 1999 emergency-certification orders as 
supporting authority,125 noting as to each the number of 
vacancies and the heavy caseload that the Fifth Circuit used to 
justify its certifications of emergency conditions.126
IV. THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE
OF SECTION 46(B)’S EMERGENCY EXCEPTION
A. What Do the Statutory Exceptions Mean? 
Before addressing the scope of the emergency exception, it 
is first necessary to address the threshold argument that  
section 46(b)’s “unless” clauses are exceptions to the 
requirement that panels consist of three judges, not the 
requirement that a majority of those judges be judges “of that 
court.”127 If so, then visiting judges could presumably never 
form the majority of a validly constituted panel, because there 
would be no exceptions to the majority requirement. The 
Rodriguez court “readily reject[ed]” that argument, relying on 
Whitehall.128
That appears to be the better view. As a textual matter, the 
exceptions could grammatically modify both the three-judge 
requirement and the majority requirement, or the majority 
requirement alone, but they could not modify only the three-
judge requirement. The exceptions follow immediately from the 
majority requirement, and it is therefore difficult to read the 
exceptions as modifying only the three-judge requirement. 
Supporting that interpretation is the 1982 Senate Report, which 
123. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1207 n.4. 
124. Id. at 1207. 
125. Id. at 1207–08. 
126. Id. Perhaps because its opinion had already referred to conditions in the Eleventh 
Circuit, see supra note 114 and accompanying text, the Rodriguez court did not explicitly 
compare the emergency conditions that prompted the Fifth Circuit’s certifications to the 
conditions then existing in the Eleventh Circuit. It did, however, refer again to Whitehall,
which itself cited the Fifth Circuit’s 1991 order. Id. at 1208 (citing Whitehall, 136 F.3d at 
232 n.3). 
 127. See, e.g., Rodriguez Petition, supra note 2, at 10–11 (11th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014). 
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discusses section 46(b)’s two exceptions in connection with the 
majority requirement but not the three-judge requirement.129
Furthermore, the Report states that, while two judges may 
constitute a quorum if the third judge becomes unavailable, “in 
the first instance, all cases would be assigned to a panel of at 
least three judges.”130 In that case, the exceptions could apply to 
the three-judgment requirement only after a panel was 
constituted, which would seem to be an arbitrary temporal 
limitation. Nonetheless, the text and purpose of the statute do 
not exclude the possibility that the exceptions could modify the 
three-judgment requirement in addition to the majority 
requirement, but that issue is unclear and ultimately need not be 
resolved here. 
Given that the emergency exception modifies at least the 
majority requirement, the central statutory issue—whether 
judicial vacancies, coupled with a heavy caseload, can trigger 
the emergency exception—must be addressed. While, as 
explained above, several circuits have resolved that issue 
affirmatively, their conclusion is far from the single clear 
choice. To foster some doubt, one need only consider that, when 
Congress revised section 46(b) in 1982 to include both the 
majority requirement and the exceptions, extended judicial 
vacancies were nowhere near as prevalent as they are today,131
 129. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 29, at 26–27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 
36–37.
130. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 19 (emphasis added); see Nguyen, 539 
U.S. at 82 (“[T]he statutory authority for courts of appeals to sit in panels, 28 U.S.C. § 
46(b), requires the inclusion of at least three judges in the first instance.”); Jordan, supra 
note 113, at 549 (“[T]he prevailing approach to panel formation and composition seems to 
be as follows. All appeals must be assigned in the first instance to a panel of three 
authorized judges. If an assigned judge becomes unavailable, the panel may decide with 
only two judges, subject to local rules that restrict the statutory authority to do so.”). 
131. See, e.g., Barry J. McMillion, President Obama’s First-Term U.S. Circuit and 
District Court Nominations: An Analysis and Comparison with Presidents Since Reagan, at 
Summary (Cong. Res. Serv. May 2, 2013) (“The average number of days elapsed from 
nomination to confirmation for circuit court nominees confirmed during a President’s first 
term ranged from 45.5 during President Reagan’s first term to 277 days during President 
G.W. Bush’s. . . . The median number of days from nomination to confirmation for circuit 
court nominees confirmed during a President’s first term ranged from 28 days (Reagan) to 
225.5 days (Obama).”); Barry J. McMillion, Length of Time from Nomination to 
Confirmation for “Uncontroversial” U.S. Circuit and District Nominees: Detailed 
Analysis, at Summary (Cong. Res. Serv. Sept. 18, 2012) (“For uncontroversial circuit court 
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and the caseload crisis facing the federal courts of appeals was 
only beginning to develop.132 Thus, as a practical matter, it 
would seem unlikely that Congress had in mind extended 
vacancies, coupled with a heavy per-judge caseload, as a form of 
emergency when it revised section 46(b) in 1982. 
Rather than acknowledging the dramatically different state 
of the federal judiciary during the era of section 46(b)’s 
amendment, both Rodriguez and the emergency panel instead 
sought to build their analyses around the one statutory example 
of emergency—“including, but not limited to, the unavailability 
of a judge of the court because of illness.”133 The panel’s 
analysis consisted of two components: 
The illness exemplified in the statute referred to an 
extended illness, not a sudden, temporary illness; 
and
If the extended illness of a single judge constituted 
an emergency, then so too must the extended 
shortage of judges due to vacancies, coupled with 
the court’s heavy per-judge caseload.134
As for the first component, the Rodriguez court opined that 
the exemplified illness must be an extended illness, because “a 
sudden, temporary illness of a judge after originally designated 
to serve on a particular panel is otherwise provided for in 
§ 46(d),”135 which authorizes a quorum of two judges in the 
event the third judge becomes unavailable.136 This interpretation 
is persuasive, though it is not the only possible reading. As one 
commentator has pointed out, Congress may have instead 
contemplated a sudden, temporary illness in order to immunize a 
two-judge quorum with one visiting judge from violating section 
from a low of 64.5 and 44.0 days, respectively, during the Reagan presidency to a high of 
227.3 and 218.0 days, respectively, during the Obama presidency.”). 
132. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 133. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b). 
134. Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1207 & 1207 n.3. 
135. Id. at 1207 n. 3. 





      05/20/2015   10:47:31
36524-aap_15-2 Sheet No. 25 Side A      05/20/2015   10:47:31
.ADLERRESEND1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2015 12:26 PM
EMERGENCY PANELS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 189
46(b)’s majority requirement.137 Lending some credence to that 
view, the Third Circuit has previously certified an emergency 
under such circumstances (though in the case of death rather 
than illness).138 On the other hand, the Second Circuit would not 
require a certificate of emergency in that situation, because it 
analyzes compliance with section 46(b)’s majority requirement 
at the time of panel formation, not at the time of decision.139 If 
that view were adopted, then the Rodriguez panel would appear 
to be correct in determining that the illness must refer to an 
extended illness, because, in that case, the exception would be 
unnecessary to ensure compliance by a two-judge quorum with 
one visiting judge following the sudden illness of the third judge 
on the panel. 
Potentially more problematic, however, is the second 
component of the panel’s reasoning—that if the extended 
unavailability of a single ill judge could constitute an 
emergency, then so too must multiple extended vacancies 
coupled with a heavy caseload.140 The difficulty is that the 
unavailability exemplified in the statute arose “because of 
illness,” indicating that the reason for the unavailability qualifies 
the scope of the exception; and vacancies may be qualitatively 
different from illnesses (and, for that matter, recusals and 
disqualifications). As Rodriguez argued in his petition, an 
illness, like a recusal or disqualification, represents an 
“unexpected, temporary, and dramatic event,” whereas extended 
vacancies arise from the political branches’ inability or 
 137. Will Baude, Is the Eleventh Circuit in an “Emergency” State? WASHINGTON POST,
Volokh Conspiracy (June 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh- 
conspiracy/wp/ 2014/06/12/is-the-eleventh-circuit-in-an-emergency-state/ (concluding that 
“the exception to 46(b) is needed even in the case of ‘a sudden temporary illness’”) 
(accessed Feb. 10, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
138. United States v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 279, 280 n.** (3d Cir. 1995) (referring to 
certification of a section 46(b) emergency to allow a Third Circuit judge and a visiting 
district judge to resolve an appeal as a quorum after the death of the second Third Circuit 
judge originally on the panel).  
139. Desimone, 140 F.3d at 458–59.
140. See Rodriguez, 753 F.3d at 1207 (“The statute contemplates the possibility of such 
emergency even in the event of an extended illness of a single judge. . . . It follows a
fortiori that the extended shortage of judges caused by the vacancies here, together with the 
heavy per judge caseload of this Circuit, qualifies as an emergency contemplated by 
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unwillingness to fill vacant seats.141 One commentator has 
similarly questioned whether Congress meant to include as the 
source of an emergency the inaction of one of its own branches, 
in addition to external factors beyond its control.142 Because 
Congress itself, through the Senate, helps fill vacancies by 
confirming nominees, extended vacancies are in a sense self-
imposed, provided that the President has made nominations. 
Complicating matters further, the recusal/disqualification 
exception applies only when “such judges [i.e., a majority from 
the presiding court] cannot sit.”143 This language—“cannot 
sit”—suggests something like an impossibility standard. If so, 
the question arises whether it governs only the 
recusal/disqualification exception or both exceptions. The 
absence of this language from the emergency exception would 
appear to suggest the former under the canon of expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius. Moreover, it is unclear how “the 
unavailability of a [single] judge because of illness” could ever 
make it impossible to empanel a majority of judges of the 
presiding court. The unavailability of a single circuit judge 
might delay the formation of a section 46(b)-compliant panel, 
but its formation would only be truly impossible if there were a 
total of two judges on the circuit, which does not describe any 
federal court of appeals. By contrast, the recusal/disqualification
exception does not speak in terms of a single judge.  
However, it is not readily apparent why the 
recusal/disqualification exception would apply only when it was 
impossible to comply with the majority requirement, while the 
emergency exception would be governed by some lesser 
standard. In this regard, the 1982 Senate Report, referring 
generally to both exceptions, rather than just the 
recusal/disqualification exception, states that they apply “when 
it is impossible to constitute a panel of a court of appeals 
composed of a majority of judges of that court.”144 As an 
 141. Rodriguez Petition, supra note 2, at 11–14. 
 142. Baude, supra note 137 (“A branch of Congress is in charge of confirming judicial 
nominees, [and] I doubt that the President and the Senate’s joint decision not to appoint a 
judge is an emergency in the sense Congress meant. Rather, I would have thought that an 
emergency is something outside of the hands of Congress and the President—whether 
because of timing or circumstances.”).
 143. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b). 
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example, the Report refers to the situation in which an entire 
court was recused or disqualified;145 while this situation would 
fall under the first exception, the Report’s discussion does not 
state that the impossibility standard would apply only to that 
exception.146
A Ninth Circuit panel, however, has suggested that 
necessity, not impossibility, is the applicable standard for the 
emergency exception.147 Hearing a post-conviction motion in a 
procedurally complicated case in which the defendant was 
himself a federal judge, that panel rejected the argument that the 
panel assigned to the direct appeal148 violated section 46(b)’s 
majority requirement.149 The court reasoned that “the chief 
judge retains a great deal of discretion in deciding when out-of-
circuit judges are needed,” and concluded that he “effectively 
certified an emergency for the purposes of section 46(b) when 
he certified a necessity under § 291(a).”150 Under this reading, a 
circuit’s chief judge has broad discretion to invoke the 
emergency exception whenever he or she determines there to be 
 145. See, e.g., United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1423 (11th Cir. 1992) (decision 
rendered by three visiting judges after “all judges of this court entered an order recusing 
themselves ‘from participating in this case and in any other cases relating to the 
investigation of the murder of the Honorable Robert S. Vance,’” an Eleventh Circuit 
judge). 
146. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 29, at 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 37.
 147. United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 148. The panel at issue in Claiborne consisted of three out-of-circuit circuit judges 
seated after the chief judge submitted a “certificate of necessity” to the Chief Justice. See
28 U.S.C. § 291(a). Congress amended § 291(a) after Claiborne, and a certificate of 
necessity is no longer required to designate an out-of-circuit judge; rather, the circuit’s 
chief judge or the circuit justice need only make a request, and the Chief Justice need only 
find the designation to be “in the public interest.” Federal Courts Administration Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, tit. I, § 104, 106 Stat. 4506. Congress amended this provision 
in order to “allow[ ] judges of the courts of appeals a regular opportunity to sit on other 
courts of appeals from time to time, on an exchange basis, as a means of promoting 
education in court administration.” S. Rep. No. 102-342, at 27 (1992) (“Such a program 
would represent a cost-effective means of familiarizing judges of the courts of appeals with 
management and administrative techniques that appear to work effectively in other courts, 
and thus allow them to consider those techniques for adaption and possible adoption in 
their own courts.”); see Levy, supra note 4, at 383–85 (discussing the use of visiting judges 
as a means of “information sharing”). A certificate of necessity remains required before the 
Chief Justice may designate an out-of-circuit district judge to serve on a court of appeals. 
28 U.S.C. § 292(d).  
 149. Claiborne, 870 F.2d at 1466 n.2; see also id. at 1464–67 (discussing appellants’ 
interrelated statutory claims).  
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a “need” for visiting judges. Federal courts of appeals would 
seemingly have little difficulty meeting that standard when 
confronted with multiple vacancies and a heavy per-judge 
caseload.151
Nonetheless, there is reason to question Claiborne’s
equation of section 291(a)’s certificate of necessity with section 
46(b)’s certificate of emergency. Necessity and emergency are 
distinct concepts,152 and it should be assumed that Congress 
deliberately required different certificates for different 
situations.153 And the threshold to designate an out-of-circuit 
judge (“necessity”) would appropriately appear to be less 
stringent than the threshold to designate multiple visiting judges 
and dispense with section 46(b)’s majority requirement 
(“emergency”). Thus, section 46(b)’s emergency exception 
arguably requires something more than necessity.  
Supporting that argument, the 1982 Senate Report
generally describes both section 46(b) exceptions as “the most 
unusual circumstances”154 or “exigent circumstances.”155 While 
it gives no indication about what circumstances aside from 
illness would constitute or give rise to an emergency, these 
descriptors arguably indicate that section 46(b)’s exceptions 
were intended to be narrow in scope. Nonetheless, one might 
argue that the 1982 Congress would consider the extended 
 151. The certificate of necessity appears to be a standardized form that does not require 
an explanation of the necessity. See Nicholle Stahl-Reisdorff, The Use of Visiting Judges in 
the Federal District Courts 49 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 2001 update 2006) (including sample 
certificate of necessity). 
 152. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 636, 1193 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 
2014) (defining “emergency” as either “[a] sudden and serious event or an unforeseen 
change in circumstances that calls for immediate action to avert, control, or remedy harm” 
or “[a]n urgent need for relief or help”; and defining “necessity” in several ways, including 
as “[s]omething that must be done or accomplished for any one of various reasons, ranging 
from the continuation of life itself to a legal requirement of some kind to an intense 
personal desire” or “[p]hysical or moral compulsion; the pressure of circumstance,” and 
noting further that “[c]ontext normally supplies a sense of the degree of urgency,” while 
recognizing that necessity may supply “a defense for a person who acts in an emergency”). 
 153. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume that 
Congress used two terms because it intended each term to have a particular, 
nonsuperfluous meaning.”); cf. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 461–62  
(2002) (recognizing longstanding rule that “courts must presume that a legislature says in a 
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there”) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 154. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 29, at 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 36.
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vacancies and crushing caseloads of today to be “most unusual” 
and “exigent.” Moreover, the statutory example of a single 
judge’s illness arguably broadens the word “emergency” beyond 
its everyday connotation. Without that example, one might not 
otherwise be inclined to consider an increased per-judge 
caseload (due to extended vacancies) as rising to the level of an 
emergency, particularly if the court declines to request 
additional judgeships or modify its case-management 
techniques.
B. When Does an Emergency Arise? 
And When Does It End? 
Compounding the uncertainty, two questions of degree 
arise even assuming that extended vacancies coupled with heavy 
caseloads can trigger section 46(b)’s emergency exception. First, 
at what point does an emergency arise? Clearly the Eleventh 
Circuit was in a perilous situation in late 2013, with four judicial 
emergencies, one third of its judgeships vacant, and the heaviest 
per-judge caseload of any circuit. But what if a court was to 
certify an emergency with, say, only one vacancy and a 
comparatively moderate per-judge caseload? What if the court 
experienced no vacancies at all but experienced a substantial 
increase in filings? While mathematical cutoffs may not be 
necessary, the adjusted-filing caseload methodology employed 
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to 
determine judicial emergencies is one that Senators often 
invoke,156 and it may also be useful in determining whether a 
section 46(b) emergency exists.  
156. See, e.g., Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Sen. Judiciary Comm., Press Release, 
Statement on Judicial Nominations, http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/statement-of-senator 
-patrick-leahy-d-vt-chairman-senate-judiciary-committee-on-judicial-nominations13 (July 31, 
2014) (“Since the beginning of this year, we have reduced the vacancies on our Federal 
courts by over a third, from 92 to 57, and reduced the number of judicial emergency 
vacancies by nearly half, from 37 to 19.”); John McCain, U.S. Sen., Press Release, Sen.
McCain on Arizona Judicial Nominees, http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/ 
press-releases?ID=f43ecf45-c34c-434b-a417-c0c8e3bb07c6 (May 14, 2014) (“Of the 13 
authorized judgeships for this court, 6 are currently vacant. This, together with the large 
caseload, led the District of Arizona to be declared a ‘judicial emergency’ in 2011.”) (both 
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Second, and relatedly, how long should an emergency last? 
General Order 41 purported to be of indefinite duration, and 
Chief Judge Carnes explained in an interview that “he [didn’t] 
have in mind a specific number of active judges the court must 
have before he would lift the order,” but that “there would be no 
more need for the emergency measure” once “the court actually 
had all 12 of its spots filled.”157 Ultimately it did not last that 
long. Judge Barkett’s vacant seat was filled in May 2014,158
Judge Edmondson’s vacant seat was filled in July 2014,159 and 
Judge Birch’s vacant seat was filled in September 2014.160 The 
following month, with one vacancy remaining, Chief Judge 
Carnes issued a new general order declaring an end to the 
emergency.161 General Order 42 explained that “[t]he 
circumstances that led to the issuance of General Order No. 41 
have changed enough so that no more panels will be composed 
of fewer than two judges of this Court,” but indicated that it 
would have an impact only “as far as future panels are 
concerned.”162
There are two ways to think about the duration issue. One 
might argue that courts should certify an emergency as soon as 
the requisite conditions exist and de-certify the emergency as 
soon as those same conditions evaporate. That symmetry would 
eliminate any confusion about what the requisite conditions 
were, and discourage declared emergencies from dragging on 
too long.163 At the same time, certifying an emergency is not 
 157. Palmer, supra note 77, at 1.
 158. John Pacenti, Robin Rosenbaum Unanimously Confirmed for Federal Appellate 
Court, DAILY BUS. REV., May 12, 2014, at A1. 
 159. R. Robin McDonald, Senate Confirms Julie Carnes to Eleventh Circuit by 94-0 
Vote, DAILY REP., July 21, 2014. 
 160. R. Robin McDonald, Senate Confirms Jill Pryor to Eleventh Circuit, DAILY REP., 
Sept. 8, 2014. 
 161. United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, General Order No. 42 (Oct. 17, 
2014) [hereinafter General Order 42]; Alyson M. Palmer, Eleventh Circuit Chief Declares 
End to Emergency, DAILY REP., Oct. 21, 2014. A copy of General Order 42 is available at  
http://wwwca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/GeneralOrder42.pdf (accessed 
Feb. 12, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 162. General Order 42, supra note 161, at 1. In order to “conserve judicial resources, 
avoid inefficiencies, and prevent unnecessary delay,” the Order allowed emergency panels 
to resolve and administer any cases that had already been argued or submitted. Id. at 1–2. 
163. Cf. Gregory Korte, Special Report: America’s Perpetual State of Emergency, USA 
Today (Oct. 23, 2014 9:11 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/22/
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necessarily a quantifiable matter of mathematics. Moreover, 
courts should have the discretion, and should perhaps be 
encouraged, to wait as long as possible, even beyond the onset 
of an emergency, before certifying one, with the hope that 
conditions will improve and render invocation of section 46(b) 
unnecessary. That restraint would limit the exception to true 
emergencies and maintain it as a last resort. But, in that case, 
courts would not necessarily be required to de-certify an 
emergency immediately following an improvement in 
conditions. For example, the Eleventh Circuit, given its heavy 
per-judge case load (even when all of its judgeships are filled), 
may have considered itself to be in a state of emergency after, 
say, the second vacancy, but may have exercised restraint by 
waiting to certify the emergency until after the fourth vacancy. 
That might explain why it declared an end to the emergency 
after only three of the four vacancies were filled. 
V. CONCLUSION: GOING FORWARD AFTER RODRIGUEZ
Various circuits have concluded that judicial vacancies, 
coupled with a heavy caseload, can trigger section 46(b)’s 
emergency exception to the majority requirement. Although the 
statutory issue is debatable, the federal courts of appeals should 
not be criticized for reaching that conclusion when confronted 
with extended vacancies and crushing caseloads. To the 
contrary, by enlisting additional visiting judges, they are 
maximizing available resources in order to administer justice 
under difficult and trying circumstances. And, in their 
estimation, the benefits to designating more visiting judges 
outweigh the costs. That judgment, forged in the trenches, 
should be afforded deference.
Nonetheless, Congress, not the courts, is ultimately 
responsible for regulating the use of visiting judges, and it has 
of emergency since Congress passed the National Emergencies Act in 1976. Thirty are still 
in effect.”) (accessed Feb. 12, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process). The longest section 46(b) emergency appears to have occurred in the Fifth 
Circuit, which did not declare an end to its 1999 emergency until 2007. Order Vacating 
Declaration of a Judicial Emergency Under 28 U.S. Code, Section 46(b), 2007 WL 43971 
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previously expressed concerns about their use. Congress enacted 
section 46(b)’s majority requirement because it believed that 
allowing visiting judges to predominate on appellate panels 
would have an adverse impact on the stability and predictability 
of circuit precedent.164 Others have similarly expressed concern 
that visiting judges, even when they do not form a panel 
majority, are more likely to destabilize the law of the circuit; and 
some have echoed Judge Birch’s concern that opinions by 
visiting judges are more likely to result in en banc review.165
The use of district judges in particular has engendered 
substantial criticism,166 and they sit by designation the most.167
Some have expressed concern that visiting district judges 
“exercise a function that they presumably were not nominated, 
confirmed, or appointed to perform,” thereby “ignor[ing] . . . 
important distinctions between the trial and appellate functions 
and between the kinds of persons who are likely to be best suited 
to perform these functions.”168 Some have suggested that 
opinions authored by district judges sitting by designation carry 
an “unavoidable asterisk.”169 And some have also suggested that 
 164. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 29, at 9, 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 
19, 36. 
 165. Benesh, supra note 22, at 305. A recent example: On September 3 and 4, 2014, the 
Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing in two cases, each of which was originally decided by a 
panel that included a visiting judge. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 
2014), rehearing en banc granted 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Roy, 
761 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2014), rehearing en banc granted 580 F. App’x 715 (11th Cir. 
2014). In Davis, a visiting judge authored the panel opinion, 754 F.3d at 1208 n.* 
(referring to Judge Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit), and in Roy, a visiting judge cast the 
deciding vote, 761 F.3d at 1286, 1298 (indicating that Judge Wilson of the Eleventh Circuit 
wrote the panel opinion, that Chief Judge Carnes of the Eleventh Circuit filed a dissent, and 
that Judge Dalton of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida was 
the third member of the panel). 
166. See, e.g., Benesh, supra note 22, at 302–03, 305–08, 313–14 (summarizing 
criticisms). 
167. See Budziak, supra note 18, at 22–23 (including table charting use of visiting 
judges by type from 1975 to 2010, and noting that “district court judges, both senior and 
active, provide more service as visitors than their appellate brethren, with active district 
court judges playing the largest role”); see also Brudney & Distlear, supra note 20, at 565–
66 (“[D]esignated trial court visitors have helped decide more than 75,000 court of appeals 
cases since 1980.”). 
 168. Saphire & Solimine, supra note 19, at 358–59.
 169. Benesh, supra note 22, at 305 (citation omitted). Indeed, during a recent oral 
argument in the United States Supreme Court, former Solicitor General Paul  Clement 
suggested that opinions written by district judges sitting by designation are entitled to less 
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visiting district judges tend to view themselves as subordinate to 
circuit judges, deferring too much and exhibiting a reluctance to 
dissent.170
Structurally too, there remains an inherent awkwardness to 
judicial mobility, with judges appointed to one court deciding 
cases in another. Mobility can also raise representational 
concerns. Before Congress authorized visiting judges, there was 
an aversion “driven largely by fears of unfamiliar judges 
imposing foreign legal interpretations on local communities.”171
Those fears may still have some resonance today for out-of-
circuit visiting judges, who were not screened by senators or 
nominating commissions from the circuits they visit, and, in that 
sense, may be considered less accountable to, or representative 
MR. CLEMENT: Well, a couple of things, Justice Sotomayor. I went back to the 
Tropiano case because it is sort of the pro genitor [sic] of this whole line of 
Second Circuit cases, and I noticed two things. One, I noticed it was written by a 
district judge sitting by designation. So I mean, I—I don’t mean anything by that 
other than this is not Marbury. Second, I would say that the second thing I 
noticed is that the debt— 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Oh, I think when I sat as a district court judge, I 
would have been insulted by that. 
(Laughter).
MR. CLEMENT: Well, it’s not—it’s a good thing you’re no longer sitting in 
that capacity, Your Honor—  
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Okay. It’s [sic] really is, for you. 
MR. CLEMENT: —because I— I certainly mean you no offense. You could 
write Marbury here. 
Supreme Court of the United States, Oral Argument Transcripts—October Term 2013, No. 
12-357 Sekhar v. United States 61, http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?Search=12- 
357&type=Site (2013) (accessed Feb. 13, 2015; copies on file with Journal of Appellate 
Practice and Process); see also Josh Blackmon, Paul Clement Disses Judges Sitting By 
Designation, Sotomayor Shoots Back, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Apr. 23, 2013), http://josh 
blackman.com/blog/2013/04/23/paul-clement-disses-judges-sitting-by-designation-sotomay 
or-shoots-back/ (Apr. 23, 2013) (quoting Clement/Sotomayor exchange from Sekhar
transcript and noting that, in Blackman’s “clerking experiences, it was not unheard of to 
give less weight to an opinion written by a visiting judge. You just weren’t suppose[d] to 
acknowledge it . . . to a judge who sat by designation . . . who now sits on the Supreme 
Court”) (accessed Feb. 13, 2015; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process).
 170. Benesh, supra note 22, at 306–07, 313–14; Brudney & Distlear, supra note 20, at 
597–98, 599; see also Saphire & Solimine, supra note 19, at 380 (“One district judge, 
dissenting from a Sixth Circuit panel decision, ‘spoke of the temerity required of a district 
judge in dissenting from the opinion of an appellate panel on which he sits by 
designation.’”) (citation omitted). 
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of, the populace subject to their decisions. And, aggravating 
those fears, some have speculated that “visiting judges create the 
opportunity for appellate judges to pursue policy goals” by 
“alter[ing] the[ ] ideological composition of the decision-making 
group.”172
Whether these concerns are warranted or exaggerated 
remains subject to debate,173 as the impact of visiting judges is 
an area ripe for further empirical research.174 But Congress must 
continue to evaluate these concerns, as it is charged with 
maintaining a delicate balance between difficult competing 
considerations. On the one hand, limiting already overburdened 
circuits to one visiting judge per panel poses risks to the 
administration of appellate justice in the face of vacancy-
exacerbated caseloads. On the other hand, the liberal use of 
visiting judges to form panel majorities poses potential risks to 
both circuit precedent and the judiciary as an institution. 
The current statutory balance allows for the regular, 
periodic use of visiting judges when they do not form a panel 
majority, but strictly circumscribes their use beyond that. 
Congress may need to revisit that original calibration now that 
Rodriguez has solidified the judiciary’s broad interpretation of 
section 46(b)’s emergency exception. Or it may not. The federal 
courts of appeals have certified emergencies since the early 
1990s, and Congress has not seen fit to revise section 46(b) in 
response, arguably sending a tacit signal of approval.
Even if Congress takes no action, certifications based on 
the vacancy-caseload combination should receive greater 
172. Id. at 24. 
 173. Resolving this debate is beyond the scope of this article. Thus, in summarizing the 
concerns about the use of visiting judges, the author does not purport to suggest that they 
are ultimately persuasive.  
174. See Levy, supra note 14, at 2415–17 (discussing court practices in relation to 
visiting judges, and observing that visiting judges are “not widely discussed in the 
literature,” and “the reliance on visitors is clearly one promising area for research”); 
Budziak, supra note 18, at 4, 162–63 (purporting, in 2011, “to provide the first thorough, 
systematic study of the visiting judge process” and suggesting avenues for future research); 
Benesh, supra note 22, at 315 (“In short, we (political scientists especially) know woefully 
little about these [visiting] judges . . . . It is about time we started paying attention to them 
and to their peculiar characteristics that may well affect how they decide cases.”) (footnote 
omitted). Of particular relevance for section 46(b) would be a study comparing the impact 
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scrutiny. Dispensing with section 46(b)’s majority requirement 
based on the vacancy-caseload combination is gradually, but 
quietly, becoming institutionalized. Furthermore, extended 
circuit vacancies and heavy caseloads are likely to persist for the 
foreseeable future, and the federal courts of appeals can now 
rely on Rodriguez as a precedent that withstood legal 
challenge.175 Thus, as a practical matter, the federal courts of 
appeals are likely to continue certifying section 46(b) 
emergencies when they are inevitably confronted with multiple 
vacancies and a heavy per-judge caseload. Again, that practice is 
unsurprising and defensible. But an emergency procedure should 
become normalized only after receiving due discussion.  
Not only would such dialogue be healthy for its own sake, 
it may even help spur progress. After all, “[t]he judicial vacancy 
crisis must end,”176 as must the crisis in volume. Statistics 
documenting extended vacancies and the heavy per-judge 
caseloads they exacerbate have failed to trigger meaningful 
reform thus far. Nor have the controversial case-management 
techniques to which the courts have been forced to resort as a 
result.177 But perhaps emergency panels, if they continue as 
predicted, and if they garner increased attention, may help bring 
those crises to their tipping point.
 175. However, the precedential value of Rodriguez may be somewhat diminished given 
the emergency panel’s own stake in the issue. See supra § III(C)(1).  
 176. Tobias, supra note 12, at 6. 
177. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
